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Legal research is increasingly moving beyond traditional 
distinctions between socio-legal and critical legal thinking, 
black letter law and legal context analysis, ‘practical’ law 
and ‘theoretical’ justice, ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
modes of writing and so on. Large parts of new legal 
research are moving towards an emplaced, embodied and 
material understanding of law that is both about the law 
itself and its theoretical and social context. In this 
chapter, I argue that this move should also be reflected 
not just in what we write but also in the way we write. I 
offer some observations on why these distinctions have 
already become obsolete in legal writing practice, despite 
the fact that they are unconsciously still practiced by 
most of us. I then suggest a few ways in which legal 
writing can move further in this theoretically rich yet 
emplaced and contextualised direction. Some of the most 
important steps are: to rethink of the essay as truly an 
essay (i.e., trial, experiment); to take risks by not striving 
for consistence above all but by allowing the text to 
unfold as a body in itself and a legal agent; to reserve a 
prominent position for the ‘I’ in its affective, multiple 
presence; and to embrace the collective urge towards a 
more just law. I conclude by summing up the most 
important distinctions that we need to overcome, and by 
revisiting perhaps the ultimate distinction between law 
and justice.
1. How to write beyond distinctions?
Writing is all about distinguishing, not least what to include and 
what to leave out. So this chapter is not about writing without 
distinctions, but about becoming aware of the distinctions we 
habitually employ when writing about the law, and then making an 
1 This text partly draws from my 2018 text ‘To Have To Do With The Law: An 
Essay’ - my first ethnographic attempt and conscious writing on writing.
effort to move beyond them. In what follows, I will be urging readers 
to leave behind at least a couple of distinctions. The first one, of a 
more formal nature, is that between socio-legal and critical legal 
writing. The second, referring more to the substance, is the 
distinction between text and context, or to put it somewhat 
differently, law and matter (and with it, other disciplines, space, 
human and nonhuman bodies, objects, even ideas). 
Ignoring at my peril Margaret Atwood’s sound advice (“Writing itself 
is bad enough but writing about writing is surely worse, in the futility 
department.” 2002: xvi), this chapter is about writing. The idea is to 
explore ways in which we can open up our writing practices beyond 
formal distinctions of who is what, or substantive distinctions of law 
on the one hand, and all other things on the other. We have been 
conditioned for too long to think, write and act according to turf-
divisions. These are insidious practices, employed in our writing in 
an often unthinking way, and embodied in the choice of authors we 
read, the conferences we attend, the law schools we seek 
employment in. Even the most progressive of us regularly 
indoctrinate our students with such distinctions. 
This, however, is not just about writing. Legal research can never be 
‘just’ writing. There is always a horizon, legal, political, social at 
large, and we are all gearing towards it. I assume here that the 
readers of this volume all share a broader horizon: the desire for a 
more just law. By artificially placing boundaries between, say critical 
and socio-legal, interdisciplinary and disciplinary-focused, or 
personal ethnographic and ‘objective’ analysis of law (even in 
context), we debilitate the possibility of the united front we need to 
present in view of all the rather extreme challenges we are currently 
facing as scholars. These challenges are well known, and appear 
equally on a micro (managerialism in universities, marketisation of 
research, quantification of teaching) and a macro level (global 
disregard of law, new geopolitical balances, insular nature of global 
political scene in terms of aid, environment and refugees, ecological 
degradation, and so on).
In the following two sections, I look into the above distinctions and 
the reasons for which they should be considered obsolete. I then 
(section 4) point to our frequent reluctance truly to leave these 
behind and move into what Adorno has called the law of the essay, 
namely a manner of writing that allows for previously invisibilised 
elements to come forth.  To do that, I argue we need to resist the 
urge for resolution (section 5) and treat the essay instead as a body 
with its own, indeed legal agency (section 6). One way of doing this 
is by insisting on using the ‘I’ both as a semantic of personal 
responsibility but also as an indication of a collectivity (section 7). 
Another way is by allowing the text to unfold – indeed we need to 
‘listen’ to the text rather than always trying to impose a form on it 
(section 8). In section 9, I sum up our responsibilities as legal 
scholars and writers, and I conclude with a listing divagation (section 
10) and a reminder of what is, hopefully, the most important reason 
for which we write: to allow for the emergence of a more just law.
2. Have we ever not been critical?
Let me start with the first distinction, that between socio-legal and 
critical. My argument is that the maintenance of the distinction does 
a disservice to both critical and socio-legal writing (traditionally 
understood). It implies that socio-legal writing cannot be critical, 
namely theoretically informed with strong critical inclinations and 
potentially even a horizon-embracing vision of the future; and, 
respectively, that critical cannot be socio-legal, namely 
pragmatically contextualised, in touch with an ever evolving society 
the study of which often necessitates a broadly understood 
empirical approach. There is no doubt, of course, that several 
theoretical publications pay scant attention to how theory is 
translated into practice, and how, more broadly, theory can make a 
difference; likewise, a considerable amount of applied research is 
not interested in the benefits that more extensive theorisation 
brings in terms of diagonal, creative and unhinged thinking. But 
things are rapidly changing: a burgeoning number of scholars in the 
last decade or so have resisted such hardlines and have produced 
work that theorises practice and applies theory, if not in equal 
measure, at least without falling in an old-fashioned binary (out of a 
large body, see indicatively Perry-Kessaris, 2017; Grabham, 2016; 
Bottomley and Wong, 2009).
The distinction (and others along the lines of ‘high theory’ versus 
grounded thought, concreteness versus abstraction, utopia versus 
pragmatism and so on) has outlived its usefulness, its relevance now 
only useful as a tool for turf-preservation. It is perhaps time to 
understand that there is good legal thinking that is aware of its 
potential effect on reality and works on this in order to give direction 
to its theoretical development; and then, there is not so good legal 
thinking that remains unconnected to reality and deliberately 
ignores its own transformative potential. Unless broadly understood 
as contextualisation, affective engagement and personal 
involvement, neither empirical studies nor mere theoretical work 
have a monopoly on reality. 
In response to this, I have tried to sketch the concept of ‘critical 
sociolegal’ research (2015), and more recently the practice of ‘law 
and theory’ (2018) as ways of moving beyond distinctions. This text 
is a continuation of the same project. It is my hope, however, that 
increasingly, any need to come up with a category for the kind of 
research we are engaging, both in this volume and increasingly in 
the wider academia, will eventually become obsolete.
3. What is the context of the law?
Considering the readership of this volume, there is no need to 
emphasise how a doctrinal focus on the letter of the law fails to 
understand what the law is. Context to the law is not what broccoli is 
to the tofu steak - the optional green bits. Rather, law’s context 
makes the text of law, imbues it with relevance, links it to reality, 
fleshes it with matter, gives it a body and positions it in space and 
time. Context is text, and the distinction between the two is 
increasingly becoming outdated, whether we are talking about 
socio-legal, critical and/or interdisciplinary research. The relevant 
question now is, how best to include context when writing about the 
law. 
The question bears considerable gravity: it has increasingly become 
the main challenge and responsibility of a legal researcher. Ethical 
approval of empirical work is precisely about the careful filtering of 
the context into the text. Likewise, the question of which theory to 
choose and how to apply it is increasingly important, not just on a 
PhD level in terms of theoretical framework but even earlier on in 
terms of undergraduate work that claims to engage with 
contemporary life. Theory needs to be there, not only because it 
strengthens the legal argument but also because it enriches it and 
opens it up to potential conflicts which the law habitually excludes. 
Finally, other disciplines enter legal thinking in the form of 
economics, gender, politics, or perhaps less traditionally in terms of 
space, time, corporeality, and so on. 
The plethora of these considerations and the particular urgency in 
which they emerge (especially political, geopolitical and 
environmental issues) leaves us with two options: either we carry on 
lamenting the loss of (a fantasy of) disciplinary sovereign of law and 
resist the tide by reinstating the boundaries of law along traditional 
lines; or we accept that law is changing in line with reality, theory 
and other disciplines, and becomes all the richer for this. In reality, I 
only see one option here.
Yet, there is one proviso: law’s function remains distinct from other 
disciplines. However much we enjoy law’s engagement with, say, 
anthropology, we are also aware of the fact that legal research is 
not anthropology. Rather, it can aspire to become a kind of, say, 
legal anthropology. This means that the text (in this case, the law) 
re-emerges from within the context: text and context, although in 
many ways identical, do not become one. Law’s social function of 
binding expectations in terms of what is allowed and what not, is an 
important one. While no doubt in a continuum with cultural, 
anthropological and sociological normative considerations, the law 
(the way understood in law schools) is still recognisable and can still 
be differentiated from other kinds of norms. Let us not become 
arrogant though: this is a spectrum, and law is only a form of 
intensification of the normative, often aided by spatial (say, in a 
court of law) and temporal (say, in times of terrorist amber alert) 
conditions. What is deemed ‘merely’ cultural, often ends up 
becoming ‘solid’ law, and vice versa.
4. Why do we all fail?
In what follows, I would like to zoom in the writing, especially legal 
essay writing, and the ways in which it can move beyond the above 
distinctions. I refer here predominantly to the art of scholarly essay 
writing, the type of writing we all engage with when reading or 
contributing to volumes such as this. There are of course other types 
of legal writing: case commentary, reports, textbooks, “scholarship” 
writing, even funding applications.  The kind of essay I am thinking 
of, however, is not limited to a formal understanding of an essay, 
whatever that might be, but potentially includes even the above 
kinds of writing and extends to any form of writing that analyses the 
law and its context. In that respect, all writing is essay writing – an 
attempt or a trial for both form and content.
This, however, is uneasy territory, since it upsets most of the ideas 
we have of what a legal essay is or should be, and consequently 
leaves us a little adrift, somewhat fumbling for the form we knew 
and trusted. Formlessness, however, has traditionally been 
considered an integral characteristic of the essay form, ever since 
Michel de Montaigne invented the term and to some extent the form 
of the ‘essay’ (essai, often translated as ‘trial’). A lawyer by 
formation, Montaigne fought against the law with characteristic 
vehemence. While his thoughts on law were convincing in many 
respects, it is our challenge to fight against some of these 
distinctions as well. In particular, Montaigne maintained that law 
cannot generate justice (“even our system of law, they say, bases 
the truth of its justice upon legal fictions” Montaigne, 1991: 603), in 
so doing maintaining a distinction between law and justice. And 
while there are different kinds of justice, and not every kind comes 
from law, we should also accept that there are different kinds of law 
too, and that the connection between them needs to be instated.
In order to reinstate this connection though, as I hope to do at the 
end of this essay, we need to think more broadly. The German 
philosopher Theodor Adorno (1984: 171) concludes ‘The Essay as 
Form’ with these words:
the law of the innermost form of the essay is heresy. By 
transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes 
visible in the object which it is orthodoxy's secret purpose to 
keep invisible.
In other words, orthodoxy of thought keeps things invisible 
(presumably out of a desire to maintain status quo and disciplinary 
lines) whereas heresy, the law of the essay, brings these to the fore. 
But is this really how we think of our writing? Does the law of the 
essay really apply to essays on law? Do we really write essays 
(etymologically, trials and experiments) or do we sometimes feel as 
if we are filling in preformulated word documents (I do)? 
Without wanting unduly to challenge our volume editors (although I 
would like to challenge them a little), all contributors received, in 
good time, a very detailed outline of how the individual chapters 
should be formatted. I am not talking about referencing style etc., 
but about the questions that each contribution is to be pondering 
on, neatly separated in easy to follow sections (an example: Section 
II of each contribution is to be “Analysis of one or more aspects of 
your experience applying this socio-legal theory/method…We do 
encourage contributors to take a reflective and reflexive approach, 
considering e.g.:  What was your project and how did you use this 
theoretical/methodological approach? How did you use this 
theory/method and what would you do differently in the future? How 
were your research choices and outcomes shaped by aspects such 
as your positionality as a researcher and ethical 
implications/choices? What are the implications of your work for the 
development of this theory/method?”) This is no doubt an expert 
editing attempt at making our (contributors) and their (editors) 
writing lives easier, and at achieving a much-valued consistency of 
outcome. Cheekily, however, my text is an ungrateful attempt at 
making my writing and their editing lives harder. I do not follow the 
suggested format, I answer only indirectly some of these questions, 
and I end up ignoring others. I hope I am not misunderstood as an 
arrogant trouble-maker: the above questions are excellent. Indeed, 
the editors ask for personal and textual positioning, future 
projections, practice-oriented facts – they ask of us to be present in 
what we write. But at the same time, despite the fact that they 
explicitly state that they “do not wish to be prescriptive about the 
content”, and I believe them, they fail.
But we all fail. Let us go back to something even more basic: the 
writing of our students. While the emphasis of my text here is not 
student-writing, I employ it as an unambiguous indication of what 
we more or less impose on ourselves (as well as our students) as the 
‘appropriate’ way of writing. So, to recall Adorno and the law of the 
essay: do we encourage, or at least tolerate heresy? I have worked 
my way through many first-year student essays, the explicit 
objective of which is not so much the chosen topic but essay-writing 
as such, researching and expressing, in short a first soft plunge in 
the world of academic writing. Year in, year out, they are asked to 
choose out of a list of topics (role of the judge, law and morality, 
statutory interpretation and so on), and every year the absolute 
majority chooses the topic of juries. The majority amongst that 
majority forms their topic along the lines of a seminar question in 
their handbook: “What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
jury system? Identify 2 or 3 points on each side of the debate.” The 
admittedly well produced (not by me) handbook provides clear 
guidance on essay writing. For the introduction for example, the 
main requirement is to “set out your approach to answering the 
question by mentioning briefly the issues you will cover. If you 
cannot do this then you are not clear on how you are going to 
approach answering the question. Go back to the question.” 
Following on, “at the beginning of each paragraph state what the 
issue is.” And as for the conclusion, emphatically “do not introduce 
new ideas!” One of the oral instructions to students, about which I 
have an extended exchange every year with the programme 
responsible, is not to use the first person personal pronoun. Passive 
voice, impersonal constructions (“it is submitted”) or at the very 
worst, ‘we’ is preferable. 
Students (we!) mostly follow the guidelines, good students at least 
(we on what we think is a good day), and produce balanced, 
reasonably-argued although understandably often hesitant and 
slightly wooden essays on juries. What is worrying though is that 
they regularly stop short from taking any position with regards to 
their chosen two or three points, and nearly always end up with a 
conclusion (and a whole text, for that matter) that does not 
introduce any new ideas (exclamation mark). I imagine that the 
argument is similar to that other argument that says you have to be 
able to master figurative painting first in order to move on to 
abstraction. I am certain that this is no longer considered valid, at 
least in trendy fine art schools, but there is something not 
altogether unattractive to it. You must first learn the basics, and 
only then fly. And naturally, I am all too aware of the problems of 
incipient writing, and I have often found myself imparting to 
students but also early career colleagues, the usual essay writing 
steps as if they were the truth.
But then, what do we sacrifice when we desire an essay to be 
merely an attempt and not a veritable trial? A trial of error and of 
bravado perhaps, but also a trial of judgement, of personal exposure 
and risk-taking? What do we lose when we only encourage well-
formed, section-arranged consistency?
5. Why must legal essays be disappointing?
The essays we write about the law have a choice: they can either 
submit to the compulsion of the law to deliver a binary resolution: 
yes/no, guilty/not guilty, legal/illegal; or they can flow along the 
other, perhaps more honest aspect of the law that never quite 
decides. This is that part of the law (or the essay) that lies in waiting 
for its interpreter/reader: as we said, law is inert until thrown into a 
context which animates it and indeed makes it the law. While the 
former way of thinking about the law is the big adversarial 
spectacle, in the mode of dramatic trials and netflix shows; the 
latter is the way law attempts to capture the future without, 
however, being able to dictate it. It is the law in its full potential: an 
opportunity to reinterpret reality. The choice of the legal essay and 
its author, to put it differently, is either to erect a fortress of a text 
along the lines of the court trial (an enclosure, a theological 
metaphor, a final testament2); or to assemble a text that is akin to a 
veritable trial, an experimentation with formats, ideas, facts, 
theories and disciplines. In short, a text that takes risks.
How can an essay achieve this? By allowing the writing to breathe. 
This potentially means many things, but for legal thinking 
specifically, it means not being geared towards resolution but 
towards the unfolding process of writing.  In other words, it means to 
2 “Enclosure not only symbolized the independence of law from political, 
commercial, and social space; it served to restrict access, limit vandalism, 
minimize the disruption of trial, and, perhaps above all, encourage deference to 
the administration of justice in a democratic society perpetually anxious about the 
authority of law and lawyers.” (Spaulding, 2012: 316).
side with new forms of law that are not adversarial but open, 
mediated, discursive, linked to practices of restorative and 
distributive justice rather than the still potent retribution models; 
and in so doing to take an implicit but sonorous distance from the 
usual patriarchal structures that demand authorial stance and other 
delusions of control. It is not enough to pronounce such goals in our 
texts. Our texts need to perform them too: we need to produce less 
“hierarchical” texts, as Andrea Lunsford calls the texts that are 
"rigidly structured, driven by highly specified goals, and carried out 
by people playing clearly defined and delimited roles" (1990: 133).
We can draw inspiration from Montaigne’s essays, famous for hardly 
ever culminating in a closure, a grand finale or morale, in short, a 
definitive conclusion. As Philip Lopate (2013: 105) puts it, 
“Montaigne’s attraction to open-endedness or “endlessness,” if you 
will, has a great deal to do with his seeking a balance, through the 
sifting of long experience and the acceptance of imperfection. 
Montaigne was a master of equilibrium; and equilibrium such as he 
advocated does not drive toward apocalypse or closure of any 
kind…He chose the essay as a form to develop, in part, because it 
offered him a way to circumvent too-hasty resolutions.”
It is not merely a question of conclusion but of overall structure. 
Lopate (2013: 211) again: ““if you know already what all your points 
are going to be when you sit down to write, the piece is likely to 
seem dry, dead on arrival.” Why is that? Because then, the whole 
focus would be on the resolution. And we often conflate academic 
rigour with this need for resolution. It is impossible to perambulate, 
and thus take risks productively and creatively, if everything is 
predetermined. Direction, political views and ethical positions, yes; 
but perfectly pre-planned analysis neatly and descriptively laid out 
should not become the fate of academic writing.
An essay should harbour for the reader surprise, delight and 
disappointment, all at the same time. Surprise at the choice of 
topics, the way they have been approached, the new connections 
with which they have been endowed. Delight at the same, but also 
at the turn of the phrases, the choice of guiding metaphor or 
metaphors that will allow the essay to speak in other disciplinary 
languages and with a bifurcated force, a common front formed by 
reasoned argumentation and metaphorical completeness. 
Above all, every essay must disappoint: if it is to be a trial, the essay 
needs to be the exact opposite of a court trial.  It needs to remain 
incomplete and to embrace this very incompleteness with pride. 
This is because “the usual reproach against the essay, that it is 
fragmentary and random, itself assumes the giveness of totality and 
thereby the identity of subject and object, and it suggests that man 
is in control of totality.” (Adorno, 1984: 159). It is important that we 
relinquish the idea that our essays are little stabs at totality. 
So, for a writing beyond distinctions, one needs to follow the desire 
of the essay. Fragment, open up, refuse to pass judgement! But: 
take position, thump on the side of the object in order to upturn it, 
flood it with other voices, break it up – and in the process, break 
yourself up too. 
6. The essay as body?
A good essay is not of course all fragmentation and incompleteness. 
There is something emerging from it, a discreet body of thought. On 
the back cover of his book Essayism (2017), a book that inspired me 
to think about writing, Brian Dillon writes
Imagine a type of writing so hard to define its very name 
means a trial, effort or attempt. An ancient form with an eye 
on the future, a genre poised between tradition and 
experiment. The essay wants above all to wander, but also 
to arrive at symmetry and wholeness; it nurses competing 
urges to integrity and disarray, affection and fragmentation, 
confession and invention.
This distinctly unlegal-sounding schizophrenia of aims is the core of 
an essay: both ancient and future, wandering wholeness, an 
emerging body of integrity amidst its own fragmentation. This is, 
therefore, another step towards an essay that moves beyond 
distinctions: the essay must emerge as an agent. Out of its words 
and phrases, a material body needs to be assembled. In other 
words, we need to understand that our writing lives beyond our 
intentions. It is prone to different readings, appropriations and 
misappropriations. It is in a continuous process of becoming – and 
that’s ok.
Adorno (1984: 161) again: “In the essay discreet separated 
elements enter into a readable context; it erects no scaffolding, no 
edifice. Through their own movement the elements crystallize into a 
configuration.” The configuration is nothing other than the much-
praised consistency. In order to be thought of as a material body 
and an agent that interacts and affects the way other agents (the 
law being one of them, but also the lawyers, the scholars, other 
disciplines, the planet as a whole), the essay needs to have a shape, 
an outline, both figuratively and in essayistic terms. A tidiness of 
sorts that to some extent subscribes to the order of wholeness and 
perhaps symmetry. Ever body has a contour – we forget though that 
this contour can be fluid and ever-changing.3
An essay worth its tentative name is a distinct body which, however, 
also forms part of a larger body, a collective effort to think and 
make the law more just. For this, the essay must engage with the 
space and time of its object: “the essay comes so close to the here 
and now of the object, up to the point where that object, instead of 
being simply an object, dissociates itself into those elements in 
which it has its life.” (Adorno, 1984: 162). Bring the object to life by 
pulverising it into zillions of particles of life-affirming materiality. Will 
life into the body of the essay by bringing its matter forth, even if 
this entails its disassembly, and link it up to other streams of 
thought and ideas that might not be obviously contiguous. This 
means: go deep into the legal technicalities and study the way the 
minutiae of law deposit themselves on every aspect of life in 
particular spaces and particular times. At the same time, do not lose 
sight of the larger task an essay sets out to fulfil: expose the 
coercive power of the law and embrace its transformative potential, 
make law and live law as part of our lives on this one planet that we 
have.
7. How many am I?
Should I be me when writing? The question is no longer whether 
research writing can present objective facts/truths (no), or whether 
bringing the ‘I’ in (in terms of pronoun and subject matter) renders 
the whole thing subjective (and therefore, irrelevant or at best 
partial) (yes, no, so what). Nor is the question whether the law can 
be approached from the point of view of the ‘I’ (yes), or whether the 
‘I’ must sublimate itself to the ‘common person’ (what is that). 
The question rather is whether the ‘I’ can move away from the 
atmospherics of the old distinctions, namely bubbles of isolation that 
decree one’s affiliation, readership, reference base and publication 
3 How legal all those bodies of law, the corpora juris that pulsate with “text, 
territory and terror” (Goodrich, 2006: 33), always channelled through sections 
and paragraphs. Goodrich has repeatedly shown us how text is body, and how 
what seems like mere legal textuality is a corporeal explosion. Matter is, after all, 
inescapable.
avenues; and into the collective body (of which the essay is part) 
that has the same desires as the author. 
Once again, and at risk of simplifying, I would say that the desire of 
the wider critical socio-legal body is to make law more just, 
regardless of affiliations and modes of writing. Old distinctions can 
be things of comfort, zones of familiarity and tested grounds. But 
this is not an essay. One has to come out and reach for the identity 
of desire across the spectrum. This is the collective body that 
matters. 
The only way of doing this is by remaining personal when writing (to 
recall our, wise after all, editors’ suggestions, “How were your 
research choices and outcomes shaped by aspects such as your 
positionality as a researcher and ethical implications/choices?”) But 
we can go further: the body of the author has to become the text. 
For what is the law if not an embodiment? How can the law be 
understood unless through the bodies that make and undo and 
interpret and resist and ignore the law? And how better to 
communicate what we want to say, if not through the community of 
our bodies?  This is the way to reach the wider body of desire for a 
more just law.
The ‘I’ is never in isolation but always part of a wider collectivity. 
The ‘I’ is multiple. Internally, “the ‘I’ is both contained and 
provisional – just as important, it is dispersed.” (Dillon, 2017: 18). 
We are never just one body, operating in a single lawscape, in some 
sort of illusion of permanence. We are always multiple and 
dispersed. But this dispersion, seemingly a weakness, can be 
strategically enlisted. Use your dispersion, spread horizontally, take 
up your minoritarian positions and break free from the thinking that 
allowed the law to distance itself from its context. And follow the 
same strategy textually too: think of Bruno Latour’s thick description 
of the Conseil d’Etat (2009), and its gravitational attraction for 
seemingly un-legal, unimportant details. This deliberate dispersion, 
this absent-minded focus, those centre-stage curios: often an 
effective way to flesh out the body of the law (see, e.g., Carr, 2016). 
8. What comes first, the idea or the writing?
Time for a bit of sculpture: a good carver does not try to give a piece 
of wood a predetermined shape. Rather, she follows the waves of 
the wood, allowing for the shape to emerge from within its matter. 
Deleuze and Guattari write: “it is a question of surrendering to the 
wood, then following where it leads by connecting operations to a 
materiality, instead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one 
addresses is less a matter submitted to laws than a materiality 
possessing a nomos” (1988: 451). The same can be said of writing. 
We regularly forget that the text is also material. We must respect 
the materiality of our texts. We cannot just impose our enlightened 
selves on them. Listening to the nomos (i.e., the internal, rules) of 
materiality rather than imposing the law on matter means: use 
matter (the wood, the text), not by submitting it to a law (of 
predetermined structure and conclusion) but by allowing through it 
an emergence. 
Listening to the object and its conditions of emergence is our way, 
as writers, to flesh out the strains, marks and wounds of the object 
itself: its gender oppression, its colonial exploitation, its 
heteronormative persuasion, its paternalistic force, its racial 
exclusion, its class slippage, its shaded mirroring of our own little 
worlds.
Listening to the text seems to be the exact opposite of the way we 
are taught (and the way we teach) to write. Unless you know exactly 
what you want to say, do not even start. Go back to the question. 
But how to know where the text will take you before you enter it? 
How to leave behind the all-consuming atmosphere of 
preconceptions, if not by listening to something else, something 
other? 
In many respects, this is similar to the previous suggestion of letting 
the writing breathe – but with one important addition: the ‘I’ needs 
to be put aside for a moment. Losing the ‘I’ means surrendering fully 
to the text and its law, accepting vulnerability, facing our fragility 
before the law, and becoming aware of it. Effectively, facing one’s 
vulnerability means becoming stronger, knowing one’s context and 
dealing with it.
Once this has happened, the ‘I’ needs to be reinstated. It is needed 
in order to channel the elements of the text, to bring in consistency, 
and to link up to the multiplicity of the community of the ‘I’. In 
reality, of course, the ‘I’ never leaves the text – it just allows 
momentarily for a different priority. This ‘I’, now collective, 
immersed in the text, returns and takes up its responsibility.
9. The responsibility of writing beyond distinctions
At this point, as a summary before moving to the final part of the 
text, I would like to offer a list of suggested steps towards writing 
beyond distinctions on the basis precisely of these distinctions. 
These are not just pronouncements of ‘what one should do’ but 
lessons emerging from the current literature that tries to do exactly 
this, namely write beyond the standard distinctions and move into 
slightly unchartered territories of thinking about law. This is 
generally a more material, embodied and spatialised literature, 
often of feminist, queer or ecological persuasion. 
So, with apologies for the inevitable violence of generalisation:
a. writing beyond distinctions is not about ignoring distinctions but 
about actively engaging with them and questioning their relevance 
at all times.
b. the first distinction that needs to be confronted is that between 
critique and sociolegal positioning. At its most impoverished, this 
distinction refers to theory v. empirical studies. At its most nuanced 
– and closest to reality - this distinction is about the way in which 
our writing enters the world: an embracing of law’s transformative 
potential and a problematisation of law’s inherent inequalities, and 
an assembling of a common front, both theoretically and empirically 
engaged, against the various challenges that we are facing.
c. the second distinction that needs to be confronted is that between 
text and context. It is important that we understand law as material, 
embodied and spatialised, rather than only as textual, abstract and 
historicised. It is further important to remember that text partakes 
of materiality, is in itself material. A method of writing that makes 
use of the semantic and experiential ‘I’, fleshes out the embodiment 
of the law. (Legal) agency is a composition of the material and 
discursive, and in that sense, an essay that engages with both these 
can be thought of as (legal) agent in itself.  As a legal agent, the 
essay should be allowed to unfold, guided by its own materiality 
(including its occasional desire to remain incomplete and therefore 
disappointing) and not only by the author’s intent.
d. the third distinction is that between legal technicalities and life 
(see also the following section on this). Law’s embodied nature 
means that there is no matter without law, and no law without 
matter. The usual jurisprudential distinctions between 
norms/rules/laws are of limited use when it comes to thinking of the 
law as a spectrum. The input of other disciplines, such as 
anthropology, sociology, geography, and so on, is invaluable in 
rethinking this distinction.
e. the fourth distinction is that between writing and the idea of 
writing. It is important of course to have strong positions and 
concrete ideas when starting to write. It is very important to express 
these succinctly and clearly. At the same time, however, we should 
not be dealing with the text in an adversarial way, the sort of thing 
that must be fought and conquered in order to express our ideas. A 
text needs to be allowed to unfold creatively, without the constant 
vigilance of our preconceived, well-researched ideas. A text needs to 
perambulate in order to discover itself and the ideas (the ones we 
thought we had and others we did not expect we had) while being 
written.
f. the fifth distinction: the individual and the collective ‘I’. Every ‘I’ is 
multiple. It always forms part of a larger body, that of a collectivity 
that shares the same desire. The writing ‘I’ needs to be fully 
personal and at the same time aware of the connection with other 
‘I’s that desire that the law become more just.
g. the sixth distinction is that between law and justice. 
(I used to despise bullet points or lists of any sort when I would 
come across them in an essay. They would interrupt the flow and 
would introduce a staccato movement that had usually nothing to 
do with the way I wanted the rest of the text to be read. Perhaps 
they were a little too black-letter law for me, a little too theological 
even.
Recently, however, I started listing things. I started appreciating the 
reading rhythm of the bated breath. I felt a playfulness in the 
promise of completeness, and indeed of education, instruction even, 
in terms of 1. 2. 3., sections and paragraphs, this archetypically 
legal form. Maybe, I thought, I am coming closer to what everyone 
seems to think that the law is. But the playfulness I found most 
attractive was not the (subversive even) promise for completeness 
but exactly the opposite. Dillon (2017: 27) puts it well: “The list, if 
it’s doing its job, always leaves something to be invented or 
recalled, something forgotten in the moment of its 
making…something to be desired.”  This space of ‘to be desired’ is 
also the space of other desires that upset our best laid plans, and a 
memento vanitatis of our supreme delusion, very legal too, that we 
can list and contain everything neatly.
I felt another playful attraction to lists, that was marking another 
delusion. Dillon (2017: 24) again: “the appearance of a list in an 
otherwise narrative or polemic piece of prose introduces – more or 
less violently – a sudden verticality in the horizontal flow of the 
text.” This verticality, a habitual sign of authorial hierarchy and 
authoritative announcement (Braverman, 2016a), was playing 
directly with my own sense of authority as an author, of which I’ve 
never had a particularly high opinion (‘death of the author’ etc.). So I 
started appreciating the awkwardness with which that vertical pole 
of 1. 2. 3. protruded in some sort of hypermasculine self-assertion 
from the horizontal and occasionally even deliberately poetic, 
whatever that is, flow of some of my texts, reminiscent of a 
shipwreck’s mast sticking out of a flat sea. Lists became my own 
footnote for the alien authority we are supposed to feel when we 
write essays on law meant to instruct, educate, transform, help.)
10. What was the final distinction again?
Writing, in the ways I have tried to discuss so far, is an experiment, 
potentially personally exposing, treading on uncertain ground 
between and above disciplines, plunging in legal technicalities yet 
being conversant in theory, experimenting with formats, structures 
and given instructions, and in general challenging the law, not only 
in terms of content but also in terms of the text’s format. The law of 
the essay is still a law: how to write a legal essay is often a blueprint 
exercise once the research has been done. But this is only the law 
that we have been accustomed to follow – the law that journal 
reviewers demand (but who are the reviewers if not us), that the 
Research Excellence Framework panels in the UK want to read (and 
again, who are they if not us), that our universities’ internal 
committees expect and explicitly ask for. But one thing we must 
realise: that the law does not exist outside ourselves, our eyes that 
read and our fingers that type our reviews. Next time we ask for 
more ‘consistency’, let’s think a bit about why we are asking for it. 
Are we not embodying a law (the law of textual orthodoxy) that 
serves a specific disciplinary technique and a disciplinary closure 
that goes against anything that is actually happening, not only ‘out 
there’ in the ‘real’ life, but even in law: anyone who has sat through 
a trial will know that the law is always an interdisciplinary excursus, 
moving from history to geography, biology to psychology, 
economics to ethics, science to media studies, gender studies to 
race theory (to mention just a few examples), and all that often in 
the ambit of a single argument. 
As writers, we need to do justice to the law of the essay. We need to 
allow it to reveal the things that orthodoxy, to recall Adorno, wants 
to keep invisible.
Montaigne, as we have seen, believed that law cannot generate 
justice. Yet we know otherwise. We have seen, time and again, law 
delivering something akin to justice that can be peace, 
psychological closure, belonging, access to what is important to us, 
and so on. We have, however, also seen that often law does not 
deliver justice –on the contrary, it sides with the fundamentally 
unjust and serves as a tool of oppression. Or perhaps that what the 
law delivers is justice only in name, and in practice is a bitter victory 
for all involved. This, however, does not interrupt the continuum 
between law and justice. We look into law in order to deliver 
something that feels just; that tries to guarantee that the same 
crimes will not happen again; that people will know what they can 
claim and will be empowered to claim it. We write about these 
instances because it is important.
A way to reinstate our faith in the connection between law and 
justice is by having one foot on the realistic (critiquing law, being 
harsh with its faults, catching out its foundational inequalities), and 
the other foot on the, broadly understood, utopian (embrace law’s 
transformative potential, see its rhetorical and actual power, think 
theoretically about where it stands in relation to the rest of the 
world, consider the planet in all we think and do). Law’s delivering 
justice is not a guarantee; nor however is a utopia. Justice itself is 
not utopian. On the contrary, justice is right here – but we need to 
open up to the possibility of seeing its connection to the law, and 
encouraging it.
Justice has been considered a bit of a dirty word, especially in some 
socio-legal circles that had enough with the impossibilities of 
deconstruction and the fuzzy talk of things to come. But we need to 
divest justice from its messianic layer, and focus on its everyday 
emergence as a thing that actually does occur. Justice is little more 
than an ethical positioning with regards to the issues at hand – as 
Jane Bennett (2010) writes, it is our responsibility to move away 
from noxious assemblages that compromise our ethics. This is what 
ethics is: a withdrawal and a subsequent debilitation of noxious 
assemblages and a move into assemblages that have the potential 
of delivering justice. Following this, our responsibility as writers 
beyond distinctions is not only to withdraw from and resist 
problematic assemblages, thereby causing their destabilisation; but 
also to embrace such ethical moments where justice emerges.
Still, there is no final repose for a writer. While rendering some 
things visible, other things necessarily become invisible. The essay 
constructs its own atmospherics of control, assembled by the 
collective desire of the writing ‘I’s to carry on (critiquing, 
constructing, transforming, analysing). Heresy can also become 
orthodoxy. It is hard to withdraw from this. It is lamentably 
comfortable, it is what the REF wants, it is what one’s readers 
expect, and so on. But at those points, when the ‘I’ begins getting 
too comfortable, the ‘I’ needs to return and start essaying.
This is when the law of the text generates justice: when the text 
never rests and more invisibilities are always revealed, especially 
the ones that were generated by our previous, well-meaning 
heresies. This is why our texts do not belong to us but to the readers 
who see our texts’ invisibilities. The essay must never rest, the ‘I’ 
must never get complacent. This is not a shock strategy, or a 
marketing scheme to keep your readers reading. This is, simply put, 
our responsibility. 
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